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TWELVE YEARS AFTER PRICE WATERHOUSE AND STILL NO
SUCCESS FOR "HOPKINS IN DRAG"*: THE LACK OF
PROTECTION FOR THE MALE VICTIM OF GENDER
STEREOTYPING UNDER TITLE VII
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that Price Water-
house's refusal to promote Ann Hopkins to partnership status because she
did not conform to its stereotypical notions of how a woman should look
or act was a violation of Title VII's' ban on sex discrimination in employ-
ment.2 Recently, however, male employees in Ann Hopkins' shoes have
been unsuccessful in their respective Title VII suits. 3 Whether Title VII in
fact prohibits an employer from discriminating against a male employee
because he acts more like a woman is a current issue of debate among
courts, and has yet to reach the Supreme Court.4
* The phrase "Hopkins in drag" was coined by Professor Case to refer to Ann
Hopkins' male counterpart in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. See Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1995) (using phraseology). For a
discussion of the facts in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, see infra text accompanying
notes 79-88.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1994). The text of Title VII provides in perti-
nent part that: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex .... " Id.
2. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype asso-
ciated with their group .... "). For an in depth discussion of the decision in Price
Waterhouse, see infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (dismissing
male employee's Title VII claim against employer for sexual harassment based on
failure to conform to gender norms); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care
Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Higgins v. New Balance Ath-
letic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); Dandan v. Radisson
Hotel Lisle, No. 97C8342, 2000 WL 336528, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000) (same);
Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714-15 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (same); Klein v.
McGowan, 36 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (D. Minn. 1999) (same), afj'd, 198 F.3d 705
(8th Cir. 1999); see also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1,
50 (1995) ("Those post-Hopkins cases that have indirectly considered claims of dis-
crimination against effeminacy in men-cases of workplace harassment of gay
men, of cross-dressing by preoperative transsexuals or transvestites, or of less ex-
treme violations of sex-specific grooming policies-have resulted in decisions
against the male plaintiffs.").
4. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Courts Open Alternate Route to Extend Job-Bias Laws to
Homosexuals, WALL ST.J., Sept. 22, 2000, at BI, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26610639
(713)
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The issue of whether Title VII protects a male employee from gender
stereotyping also becomes increasingly important to male homosexuals as
hopes for an amendment to Title VII adding sexual orientation as a pro-
tected class grow bleak.5 Congress has offered such a measure, known as
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA"), on four separate oc-
casions, with the most recent attempt failing by only a single vote.6 Never-
theless,' the recent inauguration of Texas Governor George W. Bush as the
(noting that issue is "now percolating through the courts" and "U.S. Supreme
Court has yet to rule on the precise question"); Reynolds Holding, New Spin on Sex
Discrimination Law, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2000, at WB3, available at 2000 WL
6497578 ("But some courts are suddenly suggesting the law covers a closely related
concept: whether an employee conforms to a sexual stereotype-whether, for ex-
ample, a man dresses like a man."); Joanne Wojcik, Court Limits Title VII Suits:
Claim of Bias Against Sexual Orientation Dismissed, Bus. INS., Sept. 4, 2000, at 1, availa-
ble at 2000 WL 8171735 (noting "lack of consensus by the federal courts" and that
"courts have been struggling with the issue for years" (quoting Jon Davidson of
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund)).
5. See Reynolds Holding, supra note 4, at WB3 (noting that gay men who
"flout gender stereotypes with their mannerisms or dress" would benefit from
amendment to Title VII).
The brutality that often accompanies gender stereotyping is perhaps best illus-
trated by the story of Brandon Teena, whose life formed the subject of the award-
winning film Boy's Don't Cry. See Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Damages in 'Boys Don't Cry' Murder Argued Before Nebraska Supreme
Court (Jan. 11, 2001), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/
record?record=760 (discussing story). Brandon, although born female, was living
as a man in Nebraska. See id. Two male acquaintances raped Brandon after discov-
ering his physical sex. See id. The pair then tracked Brandon down, shooting and
killing him. See id. Although Brandon was a transvestite, such persons are part of a
larger classification termed "transgendered," which applies to anyone "whose ap-
pearance is at odds with traditional gender expectations." Deb Price, People Must
Be Free to Be Themselves, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 27, 2000, at B5, availa-
ble at 2000 WL 21267946 (defining term). In another example of the harsh conse-
quences of gender stereotyping, Dwayne Simonton, a postal employee, claimed
that the gender harassment he received at work led to a heart attack and forced
him to take a $16,000 pay cut working the graveyard shift at a bagel shop. See
Bravin, supra note 4, at Bi (quoting Mr. Simonton).
6. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong.
(1996) (proposing amendment to Title VII which would prohibit workplace dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995) (same); Employment Non-Discrimination
Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994) (same). Congress' latest attempt to
expand Title VII's scope to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was
introduced by Senator Joseph Lieberman on June 24, 1999. See Gov't Press Re-
lease, Joe Lieberman, Statement on the Reintroduction of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (June 24, 1999), available at 1999 WL 2225512 (noting that only
eleven states currently protect employees from workplace discrimination based on
homosexual status). This most recent attempt to amend Title VII was also backed
by President Clinton, who noted that the last attempt at such an amendment failed
to win passage by a mere one vote. See U.S. Newswire, Statement of President Clin-
ton Uune 24, 1999), available at 1999 WL 4637140 (urging Congress to pass 1999
amendment into law).
[Vol. 46: p. 713
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forty-third President of the United States puts a damper on these efforts,
as he is a known opponent of the bill.
7
But even if a bill such as ENDA eventually makes its way into law, the
degree of protection afforded victims of male-gender stereotyping under
Title VII will still be significant in light of the fact that not all effeminate
men are gay.8 This Comment therefore explores why male-gender stere-
otyping claims, brought by homosexual and heterosexual employees alike,
have failed under Title VII and suggests what it will take for such actions to
succeed in the future.9 Part II of this Comment begins with a survey of the
history of sexual stereotyping under Title VII. 10 Part III then sets forth
possible explanations for why male victims of workplace gender harass-
ment have not been able to benefit from the holding in Price Waterhouse v.
Hapkins.11 Finally, Part IV concludes that in order to increase the likeli-
hood of success for victims of male-gender stereotyping suing under Title
VII, the Supreme Court will need to redefine "sex" under Title VII to in-
clude not only biological sex, but gender identity as well. 12
7. See Bravin, supra note 4, at BI (noting George W. Bush of Texas opposed
ENDA during November 2000 presidential election). Bush's opponent, on the
other hand, considered ENDA a top priority. See id. (discussing position of Vice
President Al Gore).
8. See, e.g., Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38 ("[N]ot all homosexual men are stere-
otypically feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.");
Case, supra note 3, at 57 (noting that femininity and homosexuality in men are "far
from perfectly overlapping categories"); cf Reynolds Holding, supra note 4, at WB3
(stating that many gay men "act and look as macho as any heterosexual. Think
Rock Hudson.").
9. This Comment deals exclusively with the problem of gender stereotyping
as it faces male employees. With respect to female victims, it has been recognized
that:
Price Waterhouse provides women who are discriminated against because of
their masculine behavior a valid Title VII claim. Contrastingly, the courts
view discrimination against men who exhibit stereotypical feminine be-
havior as discrimination against homosexuals. These men are disentitled
from bringing a Title VII claim. Ironically, this result may provide some
lesbians with some degree of Title VII protection while denying protec-
tion for some heterosexual males.
Memorandum from the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (Sept. 1,
1997), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/pages/documents/record?
record=149 [hereinafter Memo]. Nevertheless, many points raised in this Com-
ment will be equally applicable to the female victim of gender-based stereotyping.
10. For a discussion of Title VII's historical treatment of sex-based and gen-
der-based stereotyping, see infra notes 13-88 and accompanying text.
11. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For a discussion of three possible explanations, see
infra notes 89-144 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of what the United States Supreme Court should do to
resolve the obstacles confronting the male victim of gender-based stereotyping, see
infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text. As used throughout this Comment, the
term "sex" will refer to the biological differences between men and women, while
"gender" will connote the sexual aspect of one's personality. Courts generally use
the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably. See Case, supra note 3, at 2 (noting
"1gender" has become synonymous with "sex" in sex discrimination jurisprudence).
This conflation has been attributed to Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
2001]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of Title VII
The legislative history behind Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not reveal much about the meaning of its proscription against work-
place discrimination "because of ... sex." 13 Title VII was originally in-
tended to provide equal employment opportunities for racial and ethnic
minorities. 14 One day prior to its passage, however, an amendment was
proposed to expand Title VII's prohibition against employment discrimi-
nation to discrimination based on "sex."1 5 This amendment was subse-
burg, who, while serving as a litigator of Supreme Court sex discrimination cases in
the 1970s, used "gender" in place of "sex" because of her concern that the latter
term would "conjure up improper images of what occurs in porno theaters." Id. at
10. (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974
Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 1 n.1). These terms, however, have long had separate
meanings:
As most feminist theorists use the terminology, "sex" refers to the ana-
tomical and physiological distinctions between men and women; "gen-
der," by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural overlay on those
anatomical and physiological distinctions. While it is a sex distinction
that men can grow beards and women typically cannot, it is a gender
distinction that women wear dresses in this society and men typically do
not.
Id. at 10-11. In other words, gender is "to sex what masculine and feminine are to
male and female." Id. at 2.
13. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir.
1977) (acknowledging "dearth of legislative history" behind sex provision); Ulane
v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (referring to legislative
history on sex prohibition as "hardly a gold mine of information"), rev'd on other
grounds, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Peter F. Ziegler, Note, Employer Dress and
Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 965,
968 (1973) ("Ascertaining the congressional intent behind Title VII's sex discrimi-
nation provision presents a more difficult task than is ordinarily the case in analyz-
ing legislative intent.").
14. See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 ("The major concern of Congress at the
time the Act was promulgated was race discrimination." (citing 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355-2519)); Marie Elena Peluso, Note, Tempering Title VII's Straight Arrow Approach:
Recognizing and Protecting Gay Victims of Employment Discrimination, 46 VAND. L. REv.
1533, 1537 n.15 (1993) (presuming House committee hearings on Title VII lacked
any discussions concerning sex discrimination because Congress intended only to
address discrimination based on race and national origin); Ziegler, supra note 13,
at 965 (noting Title VII originally directed at racial and ethnic discrimination); see
also Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1166 (1971) [hereinafter Developments] ("In
1964, it was a commonplace notion that membership in a minority race, religion,
or national origin could unfairly hinder a job applicant.").
15. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.
1971) (noting that sex amendment adopted one day before Title ViI's passage).
The "sex" amendment was offered by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia.
See 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). Smith was an opponent
of the Civil Rights Act and was accused of offering the amendment for the purpose
of defeating the bill. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986-87 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (recognizing sex amendment was offered as "a last-minute attempt to block
the bill"); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir.
[Vol. 46: p. 713
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quently adopted, but because of its late addition to Title VII, there was
little relevant debate by Congress concerning the amendment's intended
scope or potential impact. 16 Congress did, however, reject another
amendment which would have limited Tide VII's proscription against em-
ployment to discrimination based "solely" on sex. 17 While some courts
would interpret this decision as evincing Congress' intent that sex discrim-
ination be construed liberally, others would simply rely on Congress' gen-
eral silence as support for a more narrow application of the sex
amendment. 18
1975) (en banc) (noting Rep. Smith opposed Civil Rights Act and attempted to
sabotage it by proposing sex amendment); Ziegler, supra note 13, at 968 (noting
House feared inclusion of "sex" in Title VII was attempt to "defeat or to delay"
bill); see also 110 CONG. Rc. 2581 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Green) (explaining
addition of "sex" to Title VII would "clutter up the bill" and destroy main purpose
of eradicating racial discrimination). The main argument offered in opposition to
the amendment was that sex discrimination was sufficiently different from racial
discrimination such that it warranted separate legislative treatment. See id. at 2577
(remarks of Rep. Celler). Nonetheless, despite Representative Smiths's efforts to
defeat the bill, Title VII passed with the sex amendment intact. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in employment "because of
such individual's .. .sex").
16. See, e.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386 (stating that late adoption of sex amend-
ment "engendered little relevant debate" to aid court's interpretation); Peluso,
supra note 14, at 1537 ("The amendment's hasty introduction and passage leave
little history from which to divine the intended boundaries of the concept of
'sex."'); Ziegler, supra note 13, at 968 ("The late introduction of the sex amend-
ment precluded extensive consideration of the scope of its applicability or the
broad impact that such an amendment might have on society."); see also Develop-
ments, supra note 14, at 1167 (noting enactment of sex amendment into law "came
without even a minimum of congressional investigation").
One author has recently suggested that the addition of the sex amendment to
Title VII was not as spur of the moment as most have characterized it. See Robert
C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex
Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARVJ. WOMEN & L. 137, 138
(1997) (contending that commentators and judges who view addition of sex
amendment as last minute are wrong). According to Bird, Representative Smith
was actually approached by the National Woman's Party ("NWP"), a group that
had lobbied for an Equal Rights Amendment to the constitution for forty years. See
id. at 149. The NWP knew that Smith opposed the Civil Rights Bill and suggested
that he offer a sex amendment to complicate its passage while simultaneously at-
tempting to advance their own goals. See id. Bird also points out that the sex
amendment was supported vigorously on the floor of the House by five congress-
women. See id. at 155 n.120.
17. 110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Dowdy) (offering "solely"
amendment).
18. Compare Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971) (interpreting Congress' rejection of "solely" as evincing intent to strike at
stereotypes), with Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090 (using lack of legislative history be-
hind "sex" amendment as support in rejecting challenge to sex-based grooming
policy).
5
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B. Stereotyping Job Ability Based on Sex
The first form of sexual stereotyping to be challenged under Title VII
as sex discrimination concerned general assumptions about the relative
job abilities of the sexes. 19 This category of stereotyping manifested itself
in two forms: "explicit" sex discrimination, that is, where the sex of the
employee was the sole basis for the action taken by the employer, and "sex-
plus" discrimination, that is, discrimination based on the sex of the em-
ployee plus some neutral characteristic. 20 Both the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the federal courts were quick to
find that stereotypes about one's ability to perform ajob based on his or
her sex constituted illegal sex discrimination under Tide VII. 2 1
1. The EEOC's Response to Sex Stereotyping
In enacting Title VII, Congress created the EEOC and vested it with
the power to establish guidelines for implementing the provisions of Tide
VII. 22 The EEOC, in turn, promulgated a set of guidelines addressing va-
rious issues in the adjudication of sex discrimination claims. 23 One of
those issues is the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification ("BFOQ"), an
exception to Title VII's prohibition against workplace discrimination on
the basis of religion, national origin and sex. 24 The BFOQ exception es-
sentially allows an employer to hire an employee on the basis of his or her
sex if the employer can prove that the employee's sex is "reasonably neces-
19. See Case, supra note 3, at 38 (referring to this stereotyping as "[f]irst gen-
eration" sex stereotyping and noting that it took form of "categorical exclusions of
all members of one sex").
20. Developments, supra note 14, at 1170-71 (distinguishing between "explicit"
and "sex-plus" discrimination). An example of explicit sex discrimination would
be refusing to hire a woman for a position simply because she is a woman. See
Ziegler, supra note 13, at 965-66. An example of "sex-plus" discrimination would
be a grooming code which allowed females, but not males, to have long hair. See
id. at 989. Sex-plus discrimination allows an employer to hide explicit discrimina-
tion against one sex by finding a qualification that very few members of that sex
could meet. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1172.
21. See Case, supra note 3, at 39 (discussing EEOC Guidelines on sex
stereotyping).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1994) (creating EEOC). The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is "entitled to great
deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (concluding
that because Title VII and its legislative history support EEOC's construction,
guidelines should be treated as expressing will of Congress).
23. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1972) (setting forth guidelines).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (setting forth BFOQ defense). That section
states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise ....
[Vol. 46: p. 713
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sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 25
In its guidelines on the BFOQ the EEOC explicitly stated that stereotyped
characterizations of the job capabilities of a particular sex would not war-
rant the application of the BFOQ exception, cautioning instead that em-
ployees should be evaluated on the basis of their individual capabilities. 26
2. The Courts'Response to Sex Stereotyping
The federal courts of appeals also levied an attack on sexual stereotyp-
ing concerning the relative abilities of the sexes, which initially appeared
in the form of explicit discriminatory policies.2 7 For example, both the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits rejected employers' arguments that their poli-
cies restricting women from performing jobs that required the lifting of
more than a designated amount of weight constituted a BFOQ.28 In
reaching their decisions, both courts cited to the EEOC guidelines requir-
ing that employers consider employees based on their individual capaci-
ties and not on characteristics generally attributed to their sex.29
25. Id. An example of a situation where sex may qualify for the BFOQ excep-
tion is when authenticity or genuineness is a prerequisite for ajob, as in the case of
a male actor or female actress. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (2). Under the guidelines,
however, the preferences of customers, coworkers or clients may not be considered
in determining whether the BFOQ exception is applicable. See id. at
§ 1604(a) (1) (iii). This is because such preferences may be based on stereotypes
themselves and would thus allow the exception to swallow the rule.
26. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a) (1) (i)-(ii) (discussing applicability of BFOQ ex-
ception). The guidelines state in pertinent part that:
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not war-
rant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification
exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on as-
sumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women
in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover rate
among women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped character-
izations of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that
men are less capable of assembling intricate equipment: that women
are less capable of aggressive salesmanship. The principle of non-dis-
crimination requires that in-dividuals be considered on the basis of
individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics gen-
erally attributed to the group.
Id.
27. For an explanation of "explicit" discrimination, see supra note 20 and ac-
companying text.
28. See Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969)
(holding that employer's "switchman" position which required lifting of more than
thirty pounds could not be limited to men only as BFOQ); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that employer's seniority
system allowing women to bid only on jobs requiring lifting of less than thirty-five
pounds was not BFOQ).
29. See Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 (citing EEOC guidelines on BFOQ); Bowe, 416
F.2d at 717 n.4 (same).
2001]
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In another case concerning a policy of explicit discrimination, Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc.,30 a male applicant was rejected for the
position of flight cabin attendant because the airline reserved that posi-
tion to women only.3 1 Pan Am attempted tojustify its discriminatory pol-
icy under the BFOQ exception, arguing that women were better at
performing the "non-mechanical functions" of a flight attendant, which
included attending to "the special psychological needs of its passengers." 32
Relying on the EEOC's pronouncement that customer preference may not
form the basis of a BFOQ, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Pan Am's policy would only constitute a BFOQ if
"the essence of the business operation could be undermined" by hiring
men as flight attendants. 33 Concluding that the role of a flight attendant
was merely "tangential" to the airline business, the court held that Pan
Am's hiring policy violated Title VII. 34
The courts then confronted the issue of sexual stereotyping in sex-
plus cases. 35 In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,36 a female stewardess was
terminated pursuant to United's policy allowing male stewards to be mar-
ried, but not female stewardesses.3 7 United argued that its policy did not
discriminate on the basis of sex, but merely distinguished between mar-
ried and single female stewardesses. 38 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit rejected United's argument, noting that "[t]he
scope of [Title VII] is not confined to explicit discriminations based
'solely' on sex."3 9 The court's conclusion was based in large part upon
30. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386 (discussing airline's policy).
32. Id. at 387 (explaining employer's rationale behind exclusionary policy).
33. Id. at 388-89 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(iii) (1972)). The EEOC guidelines
do not allow a BFOQ to be premised on the preferences of co-workers, customers
or clients. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (iii). This is obviously due to the fact that such
individuals may harbor the very stereotypes Title VII seeks to eliminate,
34. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389 (reversing district court's judgment),
35. For an explanation of "sex-plus" discrimination, see supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
36. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
37. See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1196 (discussing company's policy). United's policy
was based on complaints it had received from the husbands of stewardesses regard-
ing their wives' working schedules and irregular hours. See id. at 1199. Interest-
ingly, the situation in Sprogis had been prophesized by a member of Congress
during the limited debates on the sex amendment. See 110 CONG. REC. 2578
(1964) (remarks of Rep. Bass) (expressing concern for female airline employee
worried about discrimination because she is about to get married). The remarks
of Representative Bass were relied upon by Justice Marshall in another case involv-
ing sex-plus stereotyping as support for his contention that Congress did not in-
tend stereotypes concerning proper domestic roles to justify the restriction of
employment opportunities. See Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545
n.1 (1971) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring).
38. See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1197 (arguing that employer's classification permis-
sibly distinguished between classes of employees within job category of steward-
esses rather than between sexes).
39. Id. at 1198 (rejecting United's argument).
[Vol. 46: p. 713
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Congress' decision to reject the amendment to Title VII which would have
restricted the statute's prohibitive scope to discrimination based "solely"
on sex. 40 The Seventh Circuit concluded that by rejecting the proposed
amendment, "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."41 The
court therefore held that absent a connection between the no-marriage
rule for stewardesses and job performance, the policy was
discriminatory.
42
A conclusion similar to the one in Sprogis was reached by the United
States Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,43 in which it erad-
icated a sex-plus policy that accepted job applications from men with pre-
school-age children but not from women. 4 4 The Court held that such a
policy violated Title VII unless it could be shown to qualify as a BFOQ.45
Justice Marshall, who issued a concurring opinion, argued that to even
allow Martin-Marietta the opportunity to prove that its sex-plus policy was
a valid BFOQ was to allow employers to hire individuals based on stereo-
typed characterizations, in direct contravention of the EEOC guidelines. 46
Not all sex-plus policies, however, were viewed by courts as violative of
Title VII. In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,4 7 a male appli-
40. See id. at 1198 n.4 (discussing Congress' rationale for rejecting "solely"
amendment). The "solely" amendment was offered by Representative Dowdy. See
110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Dowdy). It has been suggested that
in rejecting the "solely" amendment, Congress foresaw the counterproductive ef-
fect that Title VII would have on eradicating sex discrimination in employment if it
were so limited. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stat-
ing amendment would have had "debilitating effect" on Title VII); Sprogis, 444 F.2d
at 1198 n.4 (stating amendment "would emasculate the Act"); Ziegler, supra note
13, at 969 (noting "solely" amendment would have "weaken [ed]" sex amendment);
Developments, supra note 14, at 1172 (noting amendment faced objections because
it would have "emasculated" Act). These suggestions apparently derive from a re-
mark made by Representative Case during the floor debates on the sex amend-
ment. See 110 CONG. REc. 13,825 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Case) (stating addition
of amendment "would destroy the bill").
41. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (adding that "[t]he effect of the statute [Title
VII] is not to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of
the protected class").
42. See id. at 1199 (noting that United failed to explain how marriage affects
only female flight cabin attendants' ability to meet requirements of that position).
43. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
44. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (discussing Martin-Marietta's policy). Appar-
ently, the rationale behind Martin Marietta's policy was its concern with the absen-
teeism and high turnover rate among women with pre-school-age children. See id.
(Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing family responsibilities that interfere with job
performance); see also Ziegler, supra note 13, at 982 (stating this was assumption of
employer).
45. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (stating that Title VII "requires that persons of
like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex").
46. See id. at 545 (Marshall,J., concurring) (arguing that to allow Martin-Mari-
etta to prove its policy was BFOQ "permits ancient canards about the proper role
of women to be a basis for discrimination").
47. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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cant claimed that he was denied employment because of an employer's
policy prohibiting long hair on men.48 Because long hair on female em-
ployees was permissible, the plaintiff alleged that the employer was guilty
of sex-plus discrimination in violation of Title VII. 49 Despite the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's acknowledgement of the
EEOC's position on stereotypes, the court held that Macon's policy did
not violate Title VII. 50 The court's decision was based largely upon the
lack of legislative history clarifying the scope of the sex prohibition, inter-
preting this to mean that "Congress in all probability did not intend for its
proscription of sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping im-
plications."5' The court also distinguished the decisions in Phillips and
Sprogis as involving sex-plus distinctions based on fundamental rights, such
as marriage and family, noting that a grooming policy on the other hand
was "related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run his busi-
ness than to equality of employment opportunity," which it felt was the
goal of Title VII. 5 2
48. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1086 (discussing plaintiff's Title VII claim).
Macon's policy was based on a concern that its business clients associated long hair
on men with "counter-culture types" who had recently gained negative publicity
for their conduct at a local festival. See id. at 1087.
49. See id. at 1088 (noting plaintiff's argument that were he female with shoul-
der length hair, he would not have been denied employment).
50. See id. at 1090-92 (explaining Title VII not intended to prohibit policies
like Macon's).
51. Id. at 1090 (explaining court was reasoning "by way of negative inference"
from scant legislative history). For a further discussion of the legislative history
behind Title VII's sex provision, see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
52. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (discussing decisions in Phillips and Sprogis).
The distinction between the decisions in Phillips and Sprogis on the one hand, and
Willingham on the other, has been characterized as one involving "exclusionary"
discrimination and "non-exclusionary" discrimination. Ziegler, supra note 13, at
984. Because the employers in Philips and Sprogis conditioned employment upon
the forbearance of a fundamental right, the practical effect of such action was to
exclude all or substantially all individuals who could not meet the employment
requirement, thus resulting in a loss of employment opportunity. See id. (giving
marriage and parenthood as examples of fundamental rights). However, because
a grooming code such as the one in Willingham conditions employment on a "read-
ily alterable" characteristic, i.e. cutting one's hair, the practical effect is not to ex-
clude most individuals from an employment opportunity that they can easily meet.
Id. (noting employee would not have to sacrifice protected rights). The argument
then is that because the legislative history of Title VII indicates only that it was
intended to guarantee equal employment opportunity for the sexes, but does not
suggest that an employer should be told how to run his or her business, non-exclu-
sionary discrimination does not violate the purpose of the statute. See id. at 996
("If Title VII was intended to eradicate any and all sexual distinctions made by any
employer, then Congress should [have] so expressly direct[ed]."); see also Willing-
ham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (stating that Congress intended Title VII to guarantee equal
job opportunity for both sexes). But see Developments, supra note 14, at 1172 (ex-
plaining that treatment of sex-plus classifications as non-discriminatory is
equivalent to judicial addition of word "solely" to Title VII which Congress ex-
pressly declined to do). One court relied on the same line of reasoning used in
Willingham to hold that an appearance standard requiring female newscasters to
[Vol. 46: p. 713
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3. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act ("EEOA"). 53 The EEOA's primary effect was the extension
of Title VII's substantive protections to federal, state and local employ-
ees.54 However, the reports of the House Committee on Education and
Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare cited with
approval the decisions in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,5 5 Weeks v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,56 Diaz and Phillips.5 7 These cases stood for
the proposition that employment decisions based solely or in part on the
sex of an individual, if ultimately grounded on a sexual stereotype, vio-
lated Title VII. 58 Thus, the consensus had become that Title VII required
employers to evaluate prospective and current employees on the basis of
their individual capabilities, not stereotypical generalizations about their
sex.
59
look feminine was not a violation of Title VII. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766
F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that "primary thrust" of Title VII was to
discard outmoded stereotypes aimed at distinct employment disadvantages for one
sex). Grooming codes are generally permissible under Title VII as long as they are
applied equally to both sexes. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 854
(9th Cir. 2000) ("An appearance standard that imposes different but essentially
equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment.").
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1996).
54. See id. ("All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for em-
ployment ... in executive agencies ... shall be made free from any discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin."). Id. Although the language
of the EEOA differs somewhat from that of Title VII, "it is beyond cavil that Con-
gress legislated for federal employees essentially the same guarantees against sex
discrimination that previously it had afforded private employees." Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing EEOA of 1972).
55. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
56. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 2141 n.1 (1971) (recognizing that courts
"have done much" in area of sex discrimination); S. REP. No. 92-415, at 8 n.4
(1971) (recognizing that courts voided policies that discriminate based on sex and
set legal precedent for dealing with sexual discrimination).
58. For a discussion of the facts and holdings in these cases, see supra notes
28-34 & 43-46 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974)
("The need which prompted this legislation [Title VII] was one to permit each
individual to become employed and to continue in employment according to his
or her job capabilities."); Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.
1971) ("Equality of footing is established only if employees otherwise entitled to
the position, whether male or female, are excluded only upon a showing of indi-
vidual incapacity."); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D.
Cal. 1972) ("[I]n adopting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to at-
tack these stereotyped characterizations so that people would be judged by their
intrinsic worth."); H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 2141 ("The time has come to bring an
end to job discrimination once and for all, and to insure every citizen the opportu-
nity for the decent self-respect that accompanies ajob commensurate with one's
abilities.").
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C. Stereotyping Gender Based on Sex
After concluding that employment decisions based upon stereotypical
notions of the job capabilities of one's sex constituted impermissible sex
discrimination under Title VII, courts dealt with challenges by employees
claiming to have been discriminated against for not displaying the person-
ality traits generally associated with their sex.60 Courts were much less
reluctant, however, to find that this type of stereotyping violated Title VII.
1. No Protection for the Effeminate Man
In Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,6 1 a male applicant was denied
employment as a mailroom clerk because a personnel manager consid-
ered him to be "effeminate."62 Citing to its earlier decision in Willingham,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit insisted that in
light of the lack of legislative history surrounding the passage of Title VII's
sex provision, "the prohibition on sexual discrimination could not be 'ex-
tend[ed] . . . to situations of questionable application without some
stronger Congressional mandate."' 63 Concluding that Smith was discrimi-
nated against "not-because he was a male, but because as a male, he was
thought to have those attributes more generally characteristic of females
and epitomized in the descriptive 'effeminate,"' the Fifth Circuit declined
to find that Smith had been discriminated against on the basis of his "sex"
in violation of Title VII.6 4
60. See Case, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing generations of sex stereotyping in
employment). Professor Case has characterized this particular category of stere-
otyping as the third in three generations of sex stereotyping in employment. See id.
According to Professor Case, "[flirst generation" stereotyping consisted of the cat-
egorical exclusions of one sex from employment opportunities based on assump-
tions about their relative abilities and which were subsequently outlawed by the
EEOC and the courts. Id. at 38. "Second-generation" sex stereotyping did not
exclude members of one sex categorically, but individually under the assumption
that they matched the stereotypes associated with their sex. Id. at 40-41. As an
example of second-generation stereotyping, Case cites the refusal of the city of El
Segundo, California to hire Deborah Lynne Thorne as a police officer because she
did not meet its stereotyped view of women. See id. at 40 (citing Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983)). Finally, Professor Case contends that
"third-generation" sex stereotyping is represented by the cases in which employees
were forced to conform to the stereotypes associated with their respective group.
Id. at 41.
61. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
62. Smith, 569 F.2d at 326 (discussing facts).
63. Id. at 327 (quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090
(5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)). For a discussion of the facts and the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in Willingham, see supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
64. Smith, 569 F.2d at 327 (stressing that Title VII "intended only to guarantee
equal job opportunities for males and females"). Smith also claimed that he was
discriminated against on the basis of his "affectional or sexual preference." Id. at
326. In response to this argument, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that Title VII does
not forbid discrimination on these bases. See id. (citing decisions by EEOC and
courts holding Title VII does not protect discrimination on basis of homosexuality
or transsexuality).
724
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In Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 an employee of an accounting
firm alleged that she had been fired because of her status as a male-to-
female transsexual. 66 Relying in part on the district court's opinion in
Smith, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that there was no indication in the legislative history that the term "sex" in
Title VII should be extended beyond its "traditional meaning" to include
transsexualism. 6 7 Nevertheless, the court seemed to overlook the fact that
Holloway may have also been the victim of discrimination on the basis of
his gender.6 8 For instance, the supervisor who terminated Holloway stated
in his affidavit that Holloway's appearance had caused "personnel
problems."6 9 In fact, Holloway's supervisor stated explicitly "that Hollo-
way was not terminated because of transsexualism, but 'because the dress,
appearance and manner he was affecting were such that it was very disrup-
tive and embarrassing to all concerned.' 7 °1 Nonetheless, the Ninth Cir-
cuit characterized the sole issue in the case as "whether an employee may
be discharged, consistent with Title VII, for initiating the process of sex
transformation."
7 1
In 1979, however, the Ninth Circuit was squarely faced with the issue
of whether Title VII prohibited discrimination based on gender stereotyp-
ing in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,7 2 a case better known
for its rejection of various arguments that Title VII should prohibit dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. 73 One of the cases consolidated
65. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. See Halloway, 566 F.2d at 661 (discussing facts).
67. Id. at 662-63 (citing Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1101).
68. See id. at 661 n.1 (discussing statements in supervisor's affidavit).
69. See id. (stating these problems came from Holloway's "red lipstick and nail
polish, hairstyle, jewelry and clothing, his use of the men's room and his behavior
at social functions").
70. Id. (noting district court failed to consider these facts).
71. Id. at 661. The court insinuated that it might have viewed such conduct as
sex discrimination had Holloway changed the nature of her complaint. See id. at
664. Holloway's complaint specified that she had been fired for her status as a
transsexual. See id. at 661. The court went on to state that "transsexuals claiming
discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would clearly state a cause of
action under Title VII," but noted that Holloway instead alleged discrimination on
the basis of her status as a transsexual. Id. at 664.
72. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330-32 (arguing that Title VII should protect em-
ployees from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). The appellants in
DeSantis set forth three arguments in support of their position that Title VII should
punish discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See id. (setting forth these
arguments). The first was that because male homosexuals were more prevalent in
society, discrimination against homosexuals in general would result in a disparate
impact on men, a protected class under the statute. See id. at 330 (citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). The court rejected this argument as an at-
tempt to "bootstrap" a class not protected by the statute, i.e., homosexuals, under
the guise of a protected class, i.e., men. See id. Appellants' second argument was
that employers who discriminated against male employees with male sexual part-
ners but not female employees with male sexual partners were impermissibly using
2001]
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in DeSantis concerhed a male nursery school teacher who had been fired
for wearing an earring.7 4 The school teacher argued that the school's de-
cision to terminate him violated Title VII because it was impermissibly
based on the stereotype that a man should have a "virile rather than an
effeminate" appearance. 75 Relying on its earlier decision in Holloway, the
Ninth Circuit reiterated that Title VII does not protect discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or preference. 76 The court also cited Smith
for the proposition that Tide VII does not protect against discrimination
based on effeminacy.7 7 The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that "dis-
crimination because of effeminacy, like discrimination because of homo-
sexuality or transsexualism, does not fall within the purview of Title VII."7 8
2. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Stereotyping Gender Based on Sex Violates
Title VII
In 1982, Ann Hopkins, then a senior manager at the Washington,
D.C. office of the accounting firm Price Waterhouse, was nominated for
partnership status. 79 Because Hopkins was neither admitted to nor de-
nied partnership that year, her candidacy was placed on hold until the
following year.8 0 However, when the other partners refused to reconsider
Hopkins for partnership in 1983, she sued Price Waterhouse under Title
VII, alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her
sex.8 1 As evidence of sex discrimination, Hopkins offered the evaluations
she was given by her fellow partners in 1982 which ultimately led to her
different employment criteria for each sex. See id. at 331 (citing Phillips v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)). Not only did the Ninth Circuit reject this
argument as another impermissible attempt to "bootstrap," but it also pointed out
that such employers are actually discriminating based on the same criteria: homo-
sexuality. See id. Appellants' final argument was that discrimination on the basis of
an employee's sexual partner constituted discrimination on the basis of that per-
son's sex. See id. (relying on EEOC's policy). In refuting this contention, the court
pointed out that employers were not discriminating against employees on the basis
of their partners' sex, but on the basis of the homosexual relationship itself, which
was not protected under Title VII. See id. (adding that appellants did not even
allege employers had such policies).
74. See id. at 328 (discussing facts of Strailey v. Happy Times Nursey School Inc.,
608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979)).
75. Id. at 331 (discussing appellant Strailey's argument).
76. See id. at 332 (citing Holloway, 566 F.2d 659). For a discussion of the facts
and the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Holloway, see supra text accompanying notes 65-
71.
77. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 332 (citing Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d
325 (5th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the facts and the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
in Smith, see supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
78. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 332 (relying on Smith and Holloway).
79. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 231-32. While Hopkins' suit was initiated by the refusal to recon-
sider her for partnership in 1983, her allegations of sex discrimination pertained
exclusively to Price Waterhouse's decision to place her candidacy on hold in 1982.
See id. at 233 n.l.
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candidacy being placed on hold.8 2 Although some evaluations criticized
Hopkins' "interpersonal skills," others described her as "macho," and
stated that she "overcompensated for being a woman" and that she
needed to take "a course at charm school. '83 But Hopkins' critical piece
of evidence was a statement by a Price Waterhouse representative contain-
ing suggestions for how she could improve her chances for partnership in
the future, namely that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femi-
ninely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry."8 4
At trial, Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, testified that the state-
ments made on Hopkins' evaluations were "likely influenced by sex stere-
otyping."8 5 Although the validity of Dr. Fiske's opinions were challenged
by Price Waterhouse and the dissent, Justice Brennan stated that " [n]or
... does it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's
flawed 'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new
shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interper-
sonal skills that has drawn the criticism."8 6 As for the legal relevance of
sex stereotyping, the United States Supreme Court concluded that:
[W] e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate em-
ployees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group, for "'[i]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress in-
tended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'"87
82. See id. at 235.
83. Id. at 234-35 (discussing content of evaluations). Criticisms of Hopkins'
interpersonal skills were apparently due to her abrasiveness with co-workers and
staff. See id. at 234. In addition, several partners criticized Hopkins' use of profan-
ity and in response one partner suggested that those partners objected only "be-
cause it's a lady using foul language." Id. at 235. Another evaluation stated that
Hopkins "ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat hard-nosed mgr to an
authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr candidate." Id. Not
all of Hopkins' evaluations were critical in nature, however. See id. at 234. Hopkins
had recently been very profitable for Price Waterhouse, securing a multi-million
dollar contract, and was regarded by her co-workers and clients as "an outstanding
professional" and "extremely competent, intelligent." Id.
84. Id. These recommendations were given by Thomas Beyer who spoke on
behalf of Price Waterhouse's Policy Board. See id.
85. Id. (discussing Dr. Fiske's expert testimony).
86. Id. at 256 (adding that "[i]t takes no special training to discern sex stere-
otyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring "a course at
charm school").
87. Id. at 251 (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 n.13 (1978); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971)). It is interesting to note that this statement, relied on in large part by the
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, as well as other courts holding that Title VII
prohibits stereotyping based on gender roles, does not specify which type of sexual
stereotyping Title VII proscribes, i.e., gender stereotyping or job ability. See, e.g.,
Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (D. Minn.
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Thus, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse proclaimed that sexual stere-
otyping based on gender roles amounts to discrimination on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII.
8 8
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Price Waterhouse Court was clear in its pronouncement
that stereotyping on the basis of an employee's gender is impermissible
sex discrimination under Title VII, male employees have not been able to
reap the benefits of that decision when suing for such conduct under Title
VII. 89 Currently, this anomalous result may be attributed to one or more
of three factors: 1) the tendency of courts to mistake male-gender stere-
otyping for sexual orientation discrimination; 2) the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.;90 and 3) insufficient
pleading by plaintiffs. This Section examines the effect that all three fac-
tors have had on gender stereotyping claims brought by male plaintiffs
under Title VII.
2000) (relying on same statement to hold gender stereotyping impermissible
under Title VII and thus under Title IX).
88. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (stating that employer who acts on
basis of belief that women cannot or must not be aggressive has acted on basis of
gender).
Aside from its pronouncement that sex stereotyping based on gender roles
violates Title VII, Price Waterhouse is perhaps better known for addressing the stan-
dard of causation in sex discrimination claims under Title VII. See id. at 237. That
issue concerned the question of how much of a consideration an employee's sex
would have to be in the employer's adverse decision to constitute discrimination
"because of' sex when an employer made a decision based upon a mix of permissi-
ble motives (e.g., employee's lack of interpersonal skills) and impermissible mo-
tives (e.g., sex). See id. at 237 (discussing standard of causation issue under Title
VII). The Court concluded that if the employer could prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have made the same adverse decision without taking
into account the employee's sex, it could avoid liability under Title VII. See id. at
258. This conclusion was later overruled by Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which states that such a showing by the employer may only reduce the award
of damages, but not a finding of liability. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
89. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (dismissing male em-
ployee's Title VII claim against employer for sexual harassment based on failure to
conform to gender norms); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No.
97C8342, 2000 WL 336528, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000) (same); Mims v. Carrier
Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714-15 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (same); Klein v. McGowan, 36
F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (D. Minn. 1999) (same), afjd, 198 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1999);
see also Case, supra note 3, at 50 ("Those post-Hopkins cases that have indirectly
considered claims of discrimination against effeminacy in men-cases of work-
place harassment of gay men, of cross-dressing by preoperative transsexuals or
transvestites, or of less extreme violations of sex-specific grooming policies-have
resulted in decisions against the male plaintiffs."). For a discussion of the holding
in Price Waterhouse, see supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
90. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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A. Judicial Conflation of Sexual Orientation and Gender
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination in the workplace on the
basis of sexual orientation.9 1 However, because some courts have had a
tendency to mistake gender stereotyping for discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, they have refused to extend protection to victims of the
former.9 2 Such confusion may derive from a separation of "sex" and
91. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on basis of sexual orienta-
tion). Two reasons have been cited for why Title VII's prohibition against discrimi-
nation "because of sex" does not extend to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 509, 515-16
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (analyzing meaning of "sex" in Title VII). First, the ordinary com-
mon meaning of the term sex refers to the biological distinction between males
and females as opposed to sexual activity. See id. (quoting NEW SHORTER OxFoRD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2801 (Lesley Brown ed., Thumb Index ed. 1993)). Second,
the presence of "sex" in Title VII along with other "immutable characteristics" such
as race, color and national origin suggest that the term "'could only refer to mem-
bership in a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual activity regardless of
gender."' Id. at 516 (quoting DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304,
306 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Lending further support to the fact that Title VII was not intended to protect
gays and lesbians has been Congress' repeated failure to pass an amendment to
Title VII providing such protection. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1994, H.R. 4636, 103rd Cong. (1994). Congress' latest version of ENDA was intro-
duced by Senator Joseph Lieberman on June 24, 1999. See Gov't Press Release,
supra note 6 (noting that only eleven states currently protect employees from em-
ployment discrimination based on homosexual status). This measure was sup-
ported by President Clinton, who noted that the last ENDA failed to gain approval
by only a single vote. See Statement by President Clinton, supra note 6 (urging
Congress to pass 1999 amendment into law).
Although plaintiffs have crafted various arguments for why Title VII should
cover discrimination against homosexuals, they have been rejected as impermissi-
ble "bootstrapping." See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th
Cir. 1979). For an in depth discussion of the arguments raised in DeSantis, see
supra note 73.
92. See Case, supra note 3, at 58 (discussing judicial tendency to conflate ef-
feminacy and homosexuality in men). As Professor Case explains:
The differential pull of feminine gender in males toward sexual orienta-
tion may, as suggested above, explain why there have been since Hopkins
very few suits by males arguing that sex stereotyping on the basis of effem-
inacy constitutes sex discrimination, none of them successful. It may be
because at the moment it is permissible almost everywhere to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sexual orientation that the firing of an effeminate
man is overdetermined. Even if it is not permissible to fire him for his
effeminacy, it may be permissible to fire him for the sexual orientation
that is presumed and may in fact go with it.
Case, supra note 3, at 57. Professor Valdes refers to this phenomenon as the "sex-
ual orientation loophole" in claims of sex discrimination. Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender, "and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1995).
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"gender" in Title VII jurisprudence. 9 3
The tendency of courts to mistake gender stereotyping for discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation in cases involving Title VII is illustrated
by two recent cases.9 4 In Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle,95 Edward Dandan,
93. See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination
Law: TheDisaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that
.wrong" of sex discrimination law is its focus upon rigid biological definition of
"sex" to exclusion of broader definition encompassing gender role stereotypes.)
One court expressly acknowledged the distinction between "sex" and "gender," yet
deliberately continued to use the terms interchangeably. See Hopkins v. Bait. Gas
& Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that "'gender' connotes
cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their
physical characteristics"). The Fourth Circuit's insistence on meshing the two
terms was based on its reasoning that Congress intended "sex" in Title VII to refer
only to an employee's status as a "man or woman," and that using the terms inter-
changeably imposed a "useful limit" on the term "sex" which might otherwise be
interpreted to mean sexual behavior. Id. For a discussion of the difference in
meaning between the terms "sex" and "gender" and the origin of their confusion,
see supra note 12.
94. Two cases discussed in the Background Section of this Comment also
demonstrate the conflation phenomenon. In Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
Bennie Smith sued under Title VII for being denied employment as a mail room
clerk because his interviewer deemed him "effeminate." 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th
Cir. 1978) (discussing facts). Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit rejected Smith's claim
on the basis that "the Civil Rights Act does not forbid discrimination based on
affectional or sexual preference" and that "Congress by its proscription of sex dis-
crimination intended only to guarantee equal job opportunities for males and fe-
males." Id. at 326-27 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ' Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit turned what was essen-
tially a claim for discrimination on the basis of failing to conform to gender norms
into a claim for discrimination on the basis of sexual preference. See Case, supra
note 3, at 54 (noting that both district and circuit courts "folded" Smith's sex stere-
otyping claim into claim for sexual orientation discrimination).
A more dramatic illustration of this confusion is Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery
School, a case consolidated with DeSantis, in which a school teacher alleged that he
was fired for wearing an earring in violation of Title VII. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at
328. However, Strailey found his case consolidated with two others involving dis-
crimination against gays and lesbians. See id. at 328-29 (describing other cases).
One case, DeSantis, concerned a claim by three men that they were denied employ-
ment and/or harassed on the job as a result of their homosexual status. See id.
The other, Lundin v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., involved two females who
alleged that they were terminated due to their known lesbian relationship. See id.
at 329. The Ninth Circuit even began the opinion by stating that "[m]ale and
female homosexuals brought three separate federal district court actions claiming
that their employers or former employers discriminated against them in employ-
ment decisions because of their homosexuality." Id. at 328 (characterizing ac-
tions). Although the Ninth Circuit referred to Strailey's claim as one based on "a
stereotype that a male should have a virile rather than an effeminate appearance,"
it ultimately concluded that "discrimination because of effeminacy, like discrimina-
tion because of homosexuality or transsexualism, does not fall within the purview
of Title VII." Id. at 331-32 (citing Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659
(9th Cir. 1977)); Smith, 569 F.2d at 326-27. The practice of courts such as those in
Smith and Strailey to conflate gender and sexual orientation may have accounted
for the scarcity of post-Price Waterhouse claims by effeminate men, none of them
successful. See Case, supra note 3, at 57 (raising this point).
95. No. 97C8342, 2000 WL 336528 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000).
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an assistant bartender, was consistently subjected to comments by his co-
employees such as "fruitcake, fagboy, and Tinkerbell," as well as having his
speech patterns and kinetics criticized for being feminine.9 6 Although
Dandan was homosexual, this fact was not known to his co-workers, and he
therefore argued that the verbal abuse he suffered was due to the fact that
he did "not match-up to his co-workers' expectations of what a man should
be or how he should live his life." 97 Nonetheless, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois characterized his claim as
one for discrimination based on "perceived" sexual orientation which it
held was unprotected by Title VII.9 8
In Klein v. McGowan,9 9 Josh Klein, a technician in the county sheriff's
office, was subjected to harassment which included co-workers calling him
a "homo," making fun of the car he drove, expelling flatulence in his work
space, and his supervisor installing a bell over his work space and ringing
it to upset him. 10 0 Klein maintained that he was entitled to relief under
Title VII because he had suffered discrimination based on "the sexual as-
pect of [his] personality."10 1 However, in a statement that clearly re-
flected its conglomerated view of gender and sexual orientation, the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota concluded that
"if gender and sex were equivalent under Title VII, Title VII would pro-
hibit the harassment of a male because of effeminate behavior or the percep-
tion that he is gay."10 2
Although Price Waterhouse arguably made the conduct alleged in
Dandan and Klein a violation of Title VII, neither court bothered to discuss
the decision. 10 3 The only explanation for such an omission, then, is that
96. Dandan, 2000 WL 336528 at *1 (discussing. facts). Dandan was also ex-
posed to sexually explicit insults such as "didn't your boyfriend do you last night?";
"shove [a vacuum cleaner hose] up your a**"; "take [a tube lubricator] home,
you'll have fun with it"; "do you want to eat this [pointing to his crotch]? Eat this,
Eddie"; "I hate you because you are a faggot." Id.
97. Id. at *4 (reciting plaintiff's argument).
98. Id. (citing Shermer v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 785 (C.D. Ill.
1996)). It is widely agreed that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
actual or perceived, is beyond the purview of Title VII. See Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases). However, the use of
homophobic epithets such as "fag" or "queer" may be as degrading of a man's
perceived effeminate qualities as it is of his perceived sexual orientation. See, e.g.,
Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MiAmi L. REV. 511, 617-33
(1992) (arguing that for this reason anti-gay bias should be recognized as form of
sex discrimination); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988) (same).
99. 36 F. Supp. 2d 885 (D. Minn. 1999).
100. Klein, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
101. Id. at 889.
102. Id. at 890 (noting that Title VII does not prohibit harassment on the
basis of sexuality).
103. In fact, the district court went so far as to state that "Dandan does not
direct the Court to any support for his argument that Title ViI's protection
2001]
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neither court was able to draw a distinction between the effeminate behav-
ior of the plaintiffs and their sexual orientation. 114
B. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services: Proving That Same-Sex
Harassment Is "Because of Sex"
Two years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. that sexual harassment between employees
of the same sex is actionable sex discrimination under Title VII).05 The
Court cautioned, however, that in order to prevent Tide VII from becom-
ing a "general civility code for the American workplace," plaintiffs alleging
harassment by an employee of the same sex must prove that such harass-
ment was inflicted because of their sex.' 06 The Court then gave three
stretches so far to envelop harassment based on a person's sexuality, as it is or as
perceived." Dandan, 2000 WL 336528, at *4. Because of this statement, the district
court in Dandan was later criticized for failing to "acknowledge the precedential
relevance of Price Waterhouse." Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F.
Supp. 2d 1081, 1092-93 (D. Minn. 2000). The district court in Klein also ignored
Price Waterhouse, relying instead on the district court's decision in Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. that "sex" under Title VII does not encompass the immu-
table characteristic of "gender." Klein, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (citing Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D. Me. 1998)). However, the First
Circuit later reversed Higgins on the basis of Price Waterhouse, noting that 'just as a
woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her be-
cause she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a
claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not
meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity." Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261 n.4.
104. This distinction has been expressed by the statement that "not all homo-
sexual men are stereotypically feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stere-
otypically masculine." Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000); accord
Case, supra note 3, at 57 (noting that femininity and homosexuality in men are "far
from perfectly overlapping categories").
105. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)
(discussing circuit split). Although courts were not split on the issue of whether
same-sex claims alleging tangible economic loss (e.g., failure to promote or hire)
were actionable under Title VII, they were split when it came to same-sex claims
alleging sexual harassment. See id. The Court nonetheless held that it "[saw] no
justification" in the statutory language or its precedents for limiting the applica-
tion of Title VII to same-sex claims of sexual harassment. Id.
106. Id. at 80 (addressing concern raised by respondent and amici). In Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the United States Supreme Court held that under Tide
VII, discrimination in an employee's "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment" was not limited just to "'tangible loss' of an 'economic character,'" such as
failing to promote, but also encompassed the "'purely psychological aspects of the
workplace environment."' 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). Thus, an employee could show
that he or she was discriminated against under Title VII if he or she could prove
that verbal or physical sexual conduct linked to some protected characteristic
"[h]ad the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Vinson,
477 U.S. at 65. In Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., the Court elaborated on the ele-
ments of a sexually hostile environment claim, requiring the plaintiff to demon-
strate five elements: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) the harassment
was unwelcome; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment was se-
vere or pervasive; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harass-
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examples of how a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment might demon-
strate that such harassment was based on his or her sex. 107 First, a plaintiff
could show that proposals of sexual activity were made by a harasser of the
same sex who was also homosexual.10 8 Second, a plaintiff who could not
show that same-sex harassment was motivated by the "sexual desire" of his
or her harasser could alternatively demonstrate that they were harassed in
such "sex-specific and derogatory terms" as to raise an inference of gender
animus. 10 9 Finally, a plaintiff may prove that same-sex harassment was
based on sex by offering comparative evidence of how each sex is treated
in a mixed-sex workplace. 110 Although these "evidentiary route[s]" are
not exhaustive, they have posed particular difficulties for the male victim
of gender stereotyping. 11'
Because harassment of a male due to the way in which he projects his
sexuality will usually not involve implicit or explicit sexual proposals, the
first method of proof in Oncale is not helpful when attempting to show that
ment and failed to take remedial action. See Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993). The
Court in Oncale was thus focusing on the third element required to demonstrate a
sexually hostile environment. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75 ("Title VII is directed at
discrimination because of sex, not merely conduct tinged with offensive sexual
connotations.").
The "because of sex" requirement of Title VII is generally interpreted as a
"but for" standard. See, e.g., Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The
critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed."); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982) ("In proving a claim for a hostile work environment due to sexual har-
assment... the plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she would not
have been the object of harassment."); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[T]he question is one of but-for causation: would the com-
plaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a different
gender?").
107. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (discussing methods of proof).
108. See id. at 80. The inference from this showing is that sexual proposals
from the homosexual harasser "would not have been made to someone of the
same sex." Id. Although this is only one of three possible avenues of proof a plain-
tiff can take to demonstrate same-sex harassment was based on sex, to many courts
this particular method represents the sine qua non of a same-sex harassment claim
under Title VII. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII claim fails because neither harasser nor victim
was homosexual); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1195 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 810, 812-
13 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (same); Shermer v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 784
(C.D. Ill. 1996) (same).
109. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (giving example of woman who makes clear to
another woman that she is generally hostile to presence of women in workplace).
110. See id. at 80-81 (discussing final method of proof).
111. Id. at 81 (noting that "[w] hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses
to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely
tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'dis-
crimina[tion] . . . because of. . . sex'").
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such harassment was because of sex. 112 The other two evidentiary routes
suggested by Oncale are similarly difficult to demonstrate in a male-on-
male harassment situation." I For instance, showing that a workplace is
infected with a general anti-male animus is a daunting prospect at best,
considering that most same-sex harassment between men occurs in all-
male work environments. 114 This fact also complicates a showing of dispa-
rate treatment because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to show how
a harasser treats employees of both sexes in a work environment popu-
lated entirely by men.' 15
The debilitating effect of Oncale on claims of male-gender stereotyp-
ing is best illustrated by the recent case of Mims v. Carrier Corp. 116 Quentin
112. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (ob-
serving that male who harassed plaintiff in sexually explicit manner for wearing
earring and appearing feminine lived with woman and thus might not be sexually
interested in plaintiff), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998)). Additionally, as Professor
Schultz notes:
[O]nce we move away from a sexual-desire paradigm, we can see how
harassment is not just a male/female thing, but also something that oc-
curs between men. Men can be threatened by men who are perceived to
be gay, and men who aren't married, and men who align themselves with
the interests of women, and men who just are perceived to be "wimps."
Ellen Yaroshefsky, More Than Sex: Why the Courts Are Missing the Point, Ms., May
1998, at 56, 56 (interviewing Professor Vicki Schultz of Yale Law School about sex-
ual harassment under Title VII).
113. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (discussing last two methods of demonstrat-
ing that same-sex discrimination is because of sex).
114. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 583 n.19 (citing Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp.
1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
115. See id. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Doe
Proof of disparate treatment is also elusive in the same-sex context. How
is a plaintiff to show disparate treatment if he is the only individual being
harassed, for example? And how could he ever hope to show disparate
treatment in a work environment populated entirely by men, as the Does'
workplace was?
Id. (citing Shermerv. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 784 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Vore
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161,1164 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Shermer v. Ill. Dep't
of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 784 (C.D. Ill. 1996) ("[l]f a plaintiff is unlucky
enough not to have co-workers of the opposite sex, his or her claim is barred.");
accord Memo, supra note 9 ("However, when the plaintiff works in a single-sex work-
place, gender comparisons are problematic.").
116. 88 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Another case illustrating the im-
pact Oncale has had on male-gender stereotyping claims brought under Title VII is
Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc. 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.
2000). In Hamner, a male nurse alleged that his supervisor's "lisping" and "flipping
his wrists" towards him constituted impermissible sexual harassment under Title
VII. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 706. Judge Manion of the Seventh Circuit responded to
this argument by stating that:
We have already established from Hamner's testimony that he believed
that Edwards's gestures evinced his "homophobia," and thus pertained
only to Hamner's sexual orientation, and not to his sex. And the record
contains no evidence to indicate that Edwards's gestures were motivated
by a general hostility to men, which would be an example of the type of
evidence necessary in this case to sustain Hamner's reasonable belief
claim.
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Mims, who was not homosexual, but was perceived to be by his co-workers,
was the recipient of sexually graphic comments and gestures." 17 To deter-
mine whether this harassment was a result of Mims' sex as required by
Title VII, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
consulted the suggested methods of proof in Oncale.1 18 Because the court
ultimately concluded that "Mims' deposition testimony fail[ed] to estab-
lish same-sex harassment by any of these methods," it entered summary
judgment for his employer. 119
Id. at 707 (rejecting Hamner's Title VII claim). The Seventh Circuit also noted
that "Hamner present[ed] no evidence that he was the only male nurse on the
unit, or that Edwards treated male nurses differently than female nurses." Id. at
706 n.4. For a further discussion of the decision in Hamner, see Darryl Van Duch,
Gays Held Unprotected by Title VII: 7th Circuit Cites Difference Between 'Sex' and 'Sexual-
ity', NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2000, at BI (noting impact of Hamner).
Other courts relying on the proffered methods of Oncale to determine
whether male-on-male harassment was because of sex include the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits:
The Fourth Circuit focuse[s] on the harasser's sexual attraction towards
the victim. Alternatively, the Eight [sic] Circuit and numerous district
courts address their inquiry to the harasser's treatment of one gender
compared with the other as well as whether the work environment
manifests an animus towards the plaintiffs gender, i.e., is the work envi-
ronment "anti-male" or "anti-female."
Memo, supra note 9 (discussing methods of proof in same-sex harassment cases).
117. See Mints, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 710, 712 (describing offensive behavior).
Mims' co-workers subjected him to graphic and offensive body gestures because of
their belief that he was engaging in homosexual conduct with a male co-worker.
See id. at 710.
118. See id. at 714-15 (listing three evidentiary methods of Oncale).
119. Id. at 715 (explaining entry of summary judgement). Specifically, the
district court noted that Mims' testimony revealed that his harassers were not ho-
mosexual, did not create a general hostility toward men and made homosexual
jokes to women as well as men. See id.
The harasser who harasses employees of both sexes has come to be known as
the "equal opportunity harasser" or "bisexual supervisor." See, e.g., Hocevar v. Pur-
due Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 737 (8th Cir. 2000) (denying plaintiff's Title VII
claim because harasser targeted employees of both sexes); Ellett v. Big Red Keno,
Inc., 221 F.3d 1342 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Santiago v. Lloyd, 66 F. Supp. 2d 282,
287 (D.P.R. 1999) (same); Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 915 (N.D. Ind.
1998) (same). Courts such as the district court in Mims have held that due to
Oncale's emphasis on disparate treatment, a harasser who pursues both males and
females indiscriminately cannot be harassing "because of sex." See Holman, 24 F.
Supp. 2d at 912-13 (noting that according to Supreme Court in Oncale, no Title VII
violation exists if members of both sexes harassed equally). The Seventh Circuit,
which has taken the opposite position, maintains that the fact that a harasser might
simultaneously be harassing both a man and a woman does not preclude a finding
that such harassment was based on sex, because each sex experiences that harass-
ment differently. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 578 (stressing that it is not harasser's motiva-
tions which matter in determination of whether harassment was because of sex but
experience of victim as it relates to his or her sex). This argument is consistent
with the contention that Title VII protects persons, not classes. See Miller v. Vesta,
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 706 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (citing Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
82 F.2d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Title VII protects individuals, not classes.")).
One commentator has noted that the equal opportunity harasser principle reads
too far into Oncale, which did not speak to the phenomenon. See Catherine J.
23
Nathans: Twelve Years after Price Waterhouse and Still No Success for Hopk
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The district court's strict reliance on the evidentiary methods set forth
in Oncale was not necessary, however, because the Supreme Court in On-
cale did not intend for these methods to be exhaustive.120 Therefore, the
district court might have also considered whether the harassment Mims
suffered constituted impermissible sex stereotyping under Price Water-
house.12 1 On the other hand, Mims may have contributed to this oversight
by failing to plead the theory properly in his complaint.122
C. Insufficient Pleading by Male Victims of Gender Stereotyping
Under Title VII
While some courts have explicitly recognized the applicability of Price
Waterhouse to male-on-male sex stereotyping claims brought under Title
VII, they have rejected such claims for failing to plead an appropriate the-
ory of recovery.12 3 To date, only a few plaintiffs have been able to plead
successfully. 124
1. Unsuccessful Attempts
Male victims of gender stereotyping have demonstrated a tendency to
incorporate the issue of sexual orientation into their Title VII claims and
have thus met with little success. For instance, in Simonton v. Runyon, 125 a
postal worker who had been subjected to a wide array of abuse on the basis
of his sexual orientation claimed that he had been harassed on the basis of
his sex, relying on Price Waterhouse.126 Although the United States Court
Lanctot, The Plain Meaning of Oncale, 7 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 913, 926 (1999)
(pointing out that even in workplace where both sexes experience harassment,
various arguments can be made that disparate treatment still exists).
120. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)
(using non-exhaustive language "[w] hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses
to follow").
121. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of sex stereotyping in
Price Waterhouse, see supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97 C 8342, 2000 WL
336528, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000) (noting that plaintiff failed to alert court to
support for his argument that Title VII prohibits harassment based on perceived
sexuality). For a discussion of complications faced by plaintiffs pleading male gen-
der stereotyping claims, see infra notes 123-44 and accompanying text.
123. For a discussion of male-gender stereotyping claims which have failed
under Title VII, see infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
124. For a discussion of male-gender stereotyping claims which have partially
succeeded under Title VII, see infra text accompanying notes 13844.
125. 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000).
126. See Simonton, 232 F.3d at 34-35 (reciting facts and claims). The plaintiff,
Simonton, was the recipient of comments such as "go fuck yourself, fag," "suck my
dick," "so you like it up the ass?" and "fucking faggot." Id. His co-workers also
placed his name beside the names of celebrities who had died of AIDS on the
employees' bathroom wall; taped pornographic pictures and posters to his work
area, including the picture of an erect penis and a poster stating that Simonton
was mentally ill because of his "bung hole disorder;" placed male dolls in his vehi-
cle; and sent copies of Playgirl magazine to his home, Id. at 35. Simonton initially
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the viabilityof Simonton's
theory, it concluded that it had "not [been] sufficiently pled.' 27 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that Simonton had failed to allege that the harass-
ment he endured was due to his acting in a stereotypically feminine
manner or his non-conformity with male-gender norms as opposed to his
sexual orientation.
128
Further illustrating this tendency in pleading is Hamner v. St. Vincent
Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc.,12 9 in which a doctor harassed a male
nurse by "lisping at him" and "flipping his wrists."' 30 Because Hamner
referred to this conduct in his deposition testimony as "homophobia" and
failed to assert that he was treated differently because he was a man, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that he
could not have reasonably believed that he was sexually harassed for pur-
poses of his Title VII retaliation claim.13 1 Moreover, in Higgins v. New Bal-
ance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,132 factory workers "us[ed] high-pitched voices [and]
argued that this conduct constituted unlawful harassment on the basis of his sexual
orientation, but the Second Circuit rejected this claim, recognizing that Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See id. (citing
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984)); accord Bibby v.
Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding
that factory worker harassed on basis of open homosexuality not protected under
Title VII).
127. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 37 (dismissing Simonton's second argument). The
Second Circuit noted that while recognizing the application of Price Waterhouse to
these situations might serve to protect homosexual men, it "would not bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men
are stereotypically feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically mas-
culine." Id. at 38. The court did not explain why, however, if Price Waterhouse stood
for the proposition that workplace discrimination based on sexual stereotypes is
impermissible under Title VII, bootstrapping would even be a concern in this in-
stance. For a discussion of the holding in Price Waterhouse, see supra notes 86-88
and accompanying text.
128. See Simonton, 232 F.3d at 37 (noting that record did not support
allegations).
129. 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000).
130. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 703.
131. See id. at 704 (noting that Title VII does not protect employees from
harassment on account of sexual orientation). The retaliation provision of Title
VII provides in pertinent part that "[i] t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . .. to discriminate against any individual . . .because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). Hamner claimed that the defendant terminated him
for submitting a sexual harassment grievance in violation of this provision. See
Hamner, 224 F.3d at 705. Nevertheless, in order for an employee to recover on a
retaliation claim, he or she must have had a subjective, as well as an objectively
reasonable belief, that the practice he or she was opposing was unlawful. See id. at
706-07 (discussing requirements of Title VII retaliation claim). Because Title VII
does not reach discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that Hamner could not have objectively believed that his grievance was
directed at an unlawful employment practice under the statute. See id. at 707 (con-
cluding that no reasonable jury could disagree).
132. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
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gestur[ed] in stereotypically feminine ways" to harass a co-worker.' 33
Nonetheless, the plaintiff characterized this conduct as discrimination on
the basis of his open sexual orientation. 13 4 Because the plaintiff failed to
raise a theory of recovery premised on Price Waterhouse until his appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was forced to enter
summary judgment for the defendant employer for reasons of fairness.135
Interestingly, these cases suggest that the failure by male plaintiffs to
successfully plead gender stereotyping causes of action under Title VII
may be the result of a conflation similar to that plaguing the courts. 13 6
That is, while courts have mistaken claims alleging gender stereotyping for
claims alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, plaintiffs
appear to have mistakenly interpreted the term "sex" in Title VII as en-
compassing sexual orientation.13 7
2. Successful Attempts
Male employees who have premised their Title VII gender stereotyp-
ing claims on their sex, as opposed to their sexual orientation, have
achieved limited success. For instance, in Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust
Co., 13 8 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant bank had refused him a
loan application because he was dressed in traditionally feminine attire. 1 39
When Rosa subsequently brought suit under the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act ("ECOA") for being denied a credit opportunity on the basis of
his sex, the court looked to Title VII case law. 140 Relying on Price Water-
house, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
Rosa may have a claim under the ECOA. 14 ' In another successful case,
133. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 257.
134. See id. at 258 (noting that lower court rejected Higgins's theory because
Title VII does not reach harassment based on sexual orientation).
135. See id. at 261 (noting that because Higgins failed to mention gender ster-
eotyping at district court level, "considerations of fairness, institutional order, and
respect for trial courts in our hierarchical system ofjustice all militate strongly in
favor of such a rule").
136. For a discussion of judicial conflation of sexual orientation and gender
in cases of male-on-male harassment under Title VII, see supra notes 91-104 and
accompanying text.
137. Part III of this Comment suggests that the Supreme Court should clarify
the meaning of "sex" in Title VII to avoid such confusion.
138. 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
139. See Rosa, 214 F.3d at 214 (noting bank would not provide Rosa with loan
application until he "went home and changed" into more traditional male attire).
140. See id. at 215 (examining 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994) and Title VII case
law).
141. See id. at 216 (remanding for consideration of whether Rosa had claim
under ECOA). The court stated that:
It is reasonable to infer that Brunelle told Rosa to go home and change
because she thought that Rosa's attire did not accord with his male gen-
der: in other words, that Rosa did not receive the loan application be-
cause he was a man, whereas a similarly situated woman would have
received the loan application .... Indeed, under Price Waterhouse, "stereo-
[Vol. 46: p. 713
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Cox v. Denny's, Inc., 14 2 the plaintiff, a preoperative transsexual, claimed
that a male co-worker's sexual advances and derogatory name-calling con-
stituted discrimination on the basis of sex. 143 Noting that Cox did not
condition relief on his transsexual status, but rather on his sex, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that he had
made out a claim under Title VII.14
4
D. Reconciling Price Waterhouse and Oncale
An obvious solution to the obstacles that have prevented the male
victim of gender stereotyping from reaping the benefits of Price Waterhouse
is for courts, as well as plaintiffs, to recognize that "because of sex" in Title
VII encompasses gender identity as well as biological sex. 145 If courts
would acknowledge this fact, they would be more likely to extend Title VII
protection to male plaintiffs complaining of discrimination based on their
sexuality, and less likely to assume that such claims are premised on sexual
orientation, and thus not cognizable under Title VII.14 6 If courts recog-
nized that gender stereotyping is punishable as sex discrimination under
Title VII, plaintiffs would not have to rely on theories of recovery related
typed remarks [including statements about dressing more 'femininely']
can certainly be evidence that gender played a part."
Id. at 215-16 (citation omitted).
142. No. 98-1085-CIV-J-16B, 1999 WL 1317785 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999).
143. See Cox, 1999 WL 1317785 at *1. Cox was called names such as "fag,"
"punk bitch" and "freak mother fucker." Id.
144. See id. at *2. The court recognized that "Cox [did] not expressly contend
that Frazier harassed him because of his transsexual status. The Complaint alleges
discrimination on the basis of 'sex' .... Id.
145. See Sonya Smallets, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services: A Victory for
Gay and Lesbian Rights, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136, 144 (1999) ("However, if
the 'because of sex' requirement is read to encompass gender, Title VII will pro-
vide a remedy to women who are harassed because they are not sufficiently femi-
nine and to men who are harassed because they are not sufficiently masculine
Attempts to raise a potential application of a Hopkins-style sex-stereotyping
analysis to males have focused on issues relating to sexual orientation. See, e.g.,
Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 24-28 (1992) (noting that sexual na-
ture of anti-gay harassment reflects stereotyping about what male sexual practices
are acceptable); David R. Wade, Women Denied Partnerships Revisted: A Response to
Professors Madek and O'Brien, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 120-24 (1990) (noting
that after Price Waterhouse, burden will be on employer to prove that it discrimi-
nated against employee on basis of employee's sexual orientation, not effeminacy
or aggressiveness); see also Peluso, supra note 14, at 1539 n.32 & 1548 n.125 (noting
that Price Waterhouse provided protection needed by male homosexual plaintiffs in
Smith and DeSantis); cf I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1158, 1159-66 (1991) (arguing that because discrimination against
homosexuals favors passive, dependent women and results in hierarchical polarity
between men and women, it constitutes discrimination because of sex).
146. For a discussion of the tendency of courts to conflate gender stereotyp-
ing with discrimination based on sexual orientation, see supra notes 91-104 and
accompanying text.
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to sexual orientation, and would thereby increase their chances of success
in court.14 7 While Congress may have already recognized that "sex" in
Title VII encompasses "gender," the Supreme Court has given mixed sig-
nals regarding the issue. 148
For instance, in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that stere-
otyping based on gender roles violates Title VII.1 4 9 Nine years later in
Oncale, however, the Court stressed that a plaintiff alleging same-sex sexual
harassment under Title VII must prove, by some evidentiary method, that
he or she was treated differently than an employee of the opposite sex was
or would have been. 1 5" Because making this showing of disparate treat-
ment is extremely difficult for victims of male-on-male gender stereotyp-
ing, Oncale placed a significant burden on these plaintiffs' ability to take
advantage of the Court's holding in Price Waterhouse.'5 1
147. For a discussion of the tendency by male victims of gender harassment to
premise relief under Title VII on theory of sexual orientation discrimination, see
supra text notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
148. Cf Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that sexual assault of transsexual prisoner constituted violation of Gender Moti-
vated Violence Act ("GMVA")). Noting that a determination of gender motivation
under the GMVA parallels an analysis of sex discrimination tinder Title VII, the
Ninth Circuit stated that:
We may presume that Congress, in drafting the GMVA, was aware of the
interpretation given by the pre-Price Waterhouse federal courts to the terms
"sex" and "gender" under Title VII and acted intentionally to incorporate
the broader concept of "gender." .. . We therefore decline to give the
term "gender," as used in the GMVA, a narrow interpretation that would
exclude all those, like Schwenk, who do not conform to socially-pre-
scribed gender expectations.
Id. at 1201 n.12.
149. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype asso-
ciated with their group .... "). The Court's pronouncement in Price Waterhouse has
been regarded as overruling earlier decisions holding that Title VII's prohibition
against discrimination because of sex does not extend to discrimination because of
gender. See, e.g., Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201 ("The initial judicial approach taken in
cases such as Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of Price
Waterhouse.").
150. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
("'The critical issue, Title Vl's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members
of the other sex are not exposed."' (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
25 (1993) (Ginsburg,J., concurring)). The Court suggested three methods of how
a plaintiff might go about establishing the requisite disparity in treatment between
the sexes. See id. at 80-81 (noting plaintiff could show comparative evidence of
treatment in mixed-sex workplace or evidence that harassment was motivated by
sexual desire or gender animus).
151. For a discussion of why these methods do not always work in cases of
male-gender stereotyping, see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. The
case of Dillon v. Frank offers two additional reasons, although not convincing, why
the holding in Price Waterhouse may not apply to male victims of gender stereotyp-
ing. See Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *9-10 (6th Cir.
Jan 15, 1992). Dillon, an employee of the U.S. Postal Service, was the recipient of
740 [Vol. 46: p. 713
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Illustrating the tension between these two cases was the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision to vacate and remand Doe v. City of Belle-
ville 5 2 in light of Oncale, in which the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that "U]ust as in Price Waterhouse, then, gender
stereotyping establishes the link to the plaintiff's sex that Title VII re-
quires."' 53 Thus, for claims of male-gender stereotyping to succeed under
a Price Waterhouse theory of recovery, that decision must be reconciled with
Oncale.15
4
One way to reconcile these two cases is to understand that Oncale's
emphasis on disparate treatment was a response to the concern that recog-
nizing same-sex harassment as a cause of action under Title VII would turn
the statute into a "civility code." 155 As the Court cautioned, "the statute
does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and
women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the oppo-
such comments as "fag," "Dillon sucks dicks," and "Dillon gives head," as well as a
physical assault. Id. at *1. Dillon claimed that this treatment was the result of his
co-workers deeming him not "macho" enough to be a man, and thus constituted
impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII according to Price Waterhouse. See
id. at *5 (discussing Dillon's second argument). The Sixth Circuit dismissed Dil-
lon's claim, however, distinguishing the decision in Price Waterhouse on two
grounds. See id. at *27. First, the court noted that Dillon was not faced with the
"Catch-22" situation that confronted Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse. See id. at *10
(citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251). As the Court in Price Waterhouse ex-
plained: "[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose posi-
tions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22:
out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not." Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit took it as significant that
Dillon's job did not require him to act "like a man." See Dillon, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 766, at *9. The court also singled out Price Waterhouse for involving a "spe-
cific management decision" whereas Dillon was alleging that his employer was lia-
ble for creating a sexually hostile environment. See id. The Sixth Circuit's reliance
on the "doubleness of Hopkins' bind [as] dispositive" has been criticized by one
commentator as "erroneous." See Case, supra note 3, at 62 (discussing Dillon). Sim-
ilarly, the fact that Ann Hopkins was confronted with an adverse employment deci-
sion, as opposed to a hostile work environment, did not seem to influence the
Supreme Court in holding that discrimination based on sexual stereotypes consti-
tutes a violation of Title VII. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (holding that Title
VII protects against discrimination based on sexual stereotypes). For an explana-
tion of the hostile environment claim under Title VII, see supra note 106.
152. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
153. Doe, 119 F.3d at 581-82 (comparing case to Price Waterhouse). In Doe, two
teenage brothers were subjected to verbal and physical sexual harassment by co-
workers and supervisors based on their perceived sexual orientation during a sum-
merjob cutting grass for a municipality. See id. at 566-67. The Seventh Circuit has
yet to comment on Doe following its remand by the Supreme Court. See Spearman
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98 C 0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999).
154. For a discussion of the effect that Oncale has had on the attempts of male
victims of gender stereotyping to recover under Price Waterhouse, see supra notes
116-19 and accompanying text.
155. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (acknowledging argument of respondents and
amici). The Court also pointed out that evaluating harassment in the "social con-
text" in which it occurs would also prevent Title VII from transforming into a gen-
eral civility code. Id. at 81.
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site sex." 156 Therefore, it may not be as important for a male victim of
gender stereotyping to show disparate treatment as it would be for him to
show that the harassment he suffered was more than "innocuous. ' 15 7 Ac-
cordingly, demonstrating that gender stereotyping was "severe or perva-
sive" might be enough to distinguish real claims of sexual harassment
from frivolous ones. 1
58
Understanding this as the underlying concern of Oncale, Price Water-
house can then be read more consistently with that decision: a male victim
of gender stereotyping may seek redress under a Price Waterhouse theory of
recovery as long as he can show, by some means, that the harassment he
endured was severe or pervasive. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe can
also be reconciled with Oncale.159 Although the Supreme Court did not
explain its decision to vacate and remand Doe, it may have done so because
the Seventh Circuit had also held in Doe that the sexually explicit nature of
harassment is enough to render it sex discrimination. 160 Certainly, one
can imagine various scenarios where alleged harassment is sexually ex-
plicit but fails to rise to the level punishable by Title VII. 16 1
156. Id. at 81.
157. Along this line, one commentator has argued that Oncale should be
treated simply as a pro-plaintiff opinion, and that "the assorted examples, exhorta-
tions, and suggestions that accompany it" should be ignored. See Lanctot, supra
note 119, at 941 (arguing that Oncale should be "tak[en] ... at face value") Profes-
sor Lanctot reaches this conclusion for four reasons. First, she notes that Justice
Scalia, who authored the opinion, has issued several unanimous pro-plaintiff opin-
ions in previous cases dealing with sexual harassment. See id. at 927. Second, Pro-
fessor Lanctot points out that unanimous decisions such as Oncale reflect no
particular political philosophy. See id. at 938 (noting that people should hesitate to
give Oncale restrictive interpretation based on conservativeness of author). Third,
Professor Lanctot emphasizes that Scalia's approach to sexual harassment jurispru-
dence has been "fluid." See id. (discussing cses). Finally, and perhaps most signifi-
cantly, Professor Lanctot stresses that the language used in an opinion may reflect
more of a compromise on the bench, rather than the intent of a particular writer.
See id. at 940 (adding that unanimous opinions especially are products of
compromise).
158. Cf Spearman, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (recognizing plaintiff's right to re-
lief under Price Waterhouse but concluding harassment was not severe or pervasive).
For a discussion of the hostile work environment claim under Title VII, see supra
note 106.
159. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 50-91 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
in part that gender stereotyping is sufficient to meet Title VI's "because of sex"
requirement).
160. See id. at 580 (noting that sexual language or assault is inseparable from
gender of victim); see also Smallets, supra note 145, at 146 ("Since the circuit court
[in Doe] based its conclusion alternatively on these two arguments, it is unclear
what changes the court will need to make in order to conform its opinion to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale.").
161. Although the Supreme Court did not comment on Doe when it vacated
and remanded the decision, it did state in Oncale that "[w]e have never held that
workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content
or connotations." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Today, much like Ann Hopkins in 1989, an effeminate male em-
ployee may be the target of discrimination because he fails to live up to his
co-worker's or supervisor's expectations of how a man should look or act.
Unlike Ann Hopkins, however, these plaintiffs are left without any means
of recourse due to confusion surrounding the meaning of "sex" in Title
VII. 162 Therefore, the Supreme Court should declare once and for all
that Title VII's prohibition against discrimination because of "sex" also
encompasses discrimination on the basis of gender.
1 63
Recognizing that Title VII prohibits gender stereotyping in the work-
place would not bootstrap protection for homosexuals under the statute
because effeminacy and homosexuality do not go hand in hand. 164 In
addition, the requirement that victims of gender stereotyping prove they
were treated worse than the opposite sex is inconsistent with the principle
that Title VII protects persons, not classes. 165 Most importantly, the fact
that a person dresses or acts in a way that diverges from what would be
expected, given his or her biological sex, is completely unrelated to that
person's ability as an employee. 1 66 Congress clearly intended to eliminate
discrimination in employment on such an arbitrary basis.'
67
Stephen J Nathans
162. For a discussion of the complications of male- gender stereotyping
claims under Title VII, see supra notes 91-137 and accompanying text.
163. The Supreme Court has already recognized that the purpose of Title VII
was to remedy "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of ... impermissible
classification[s]." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). If there is
any doubt as to whether sexual stereotyping is such an impermissible classification,
it must be remembered that Title VII is a remedial statute and that "remedial legis-
lation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes." Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
164. See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that this
very fact prevents "bootstrap[ping] protection for sexual orientation into Title
Vii").
165. See Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 706 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (noting
that approach that insists harassment is actionable only when members of one gen-
der are victimized is inconsistent with this principle).
166. Along this line, recent works have focused on understanding that the
wrong of sexual harassment is that both women and men are forced to conform to
gender roles which limit their opportunities. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New
Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1998) (arguing
that wrong of sexual harassment is preservation of masculine norms in workplace);
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REx'. 691,
691 (1998) (arguing that wrong of sexual harassment is "sexism" which "feminizes
women and masculinizes men, renders women sexual objects and men sexual
subjects").
167. While Congress may not have foreseen the plight of the effeminate male
employee when it added the "sex" provision to Title VII in 1964, its refusal to
restrict Title VII's prohibitive scope to discrimination based "solely" on sex was
significant. See 110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964) (rejecting amendment offered by Rep.
Dowdy). The Seventh Circuit interpreted this move as evincing Congress' intent
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to "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women result-
ing from sex stereotypes." Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court, in turn, relied heavily on this statement in
holding that the gender-based evaluations of Ann Hopkins constituted a clear vio-
lation of Title VII. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(quoting Sprogis). Consistent with this interpretation, Title VII has historically
been applied to disqualify employment decisions based on the sex of an employee
when that employee's sex is unrelated to the particular job in question. For a
discussion of this historical treatment, see supra notes 22-88 and accompanying
text.
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